Karlis Neretnieks and Bo Hugemark, authors of researches and former high-ranking officers who are now members of the Swedish Atlantic Council, told BNS in Vilnius that Lithuania should raise defense spending after handling the crisis in a rather successful manner. In their opinion, the strategic distancing of the US from Europe may present an opportunity for Russia to step up its power polics in the old continent.
What role does the Kaliningrad region play in the security environment of Eastern and Northern Europe and does the recent military buildup in Kaliningrad pose any threat to the security of this region?
Hugemark: That depends on what happens. It's not a threat now. The presence of Kaliningrad region and its military resources worsen the situation of the Baltic states, of course. One of the reasons why we are beginning to talk about Russia more and more in Sweden is not because Russia is a threat to Sweden as such, but because we have made the declaration of solidarity and said that Sweden should be able to provide and receive military assistance. The Kaliningrad region is certainly very important in that case.
Neretnieks: Modern weapon systems, air defense systems and also ground-to-ground systems like S-400 and Iskander make the Kaliningrad oblast much more important from a military point of view than it was before.
Would you say that, by making such a statement, Swedish parliamentarians denounced the longstanding policy of neutrality?
Hugemark: Yes, they did.
Neretnieks: Very clearly - yes. Already in the nineties, we scrapped the neutrality policy but now it's put on paper: that we don't expect to be able to stay outside a conflict in our neighborhood. To my mind, this is a revolution in Swedish thinking about security policy. In the early 1800s, Sweden more or less withdrew from European politics - by declaring neutrality in 1814, to be exact. This declaration from 2009 is a 180-degree turn. Now we are back in the security pattern of Europe.
Hugemark: Joint planning on the operational level, then exercises with all types of weapon systems or forces together with NATO and together with the Baltic states. Coordination of command and control. That has not yet started.
Neretnieks: It has started to some degree but it has to be increased significantly. The solidarity declaration lacks in credibility if we don't have all these common exercises, common planning and everything.
Do you see it coming, joint exercises?
Neretnieks: Very slowly. Its moving in small steps.
What is the role of finances in development of military cooperation and defense capacities? Is small defense spending in Lithuania a problem?
Neretnieks: Lithuania spends around 1 percent of GDP on defense, Latvia has something similar, the Estonians are spending nearly 2 percent. But as far as I understood it, Latvia and Lithuania made a commitment to increase defense spending when the economic crisis passes.
Lets compare this with what the Chinese did 30 years ago. They said it was extremely important to have a stable and good economy, otherwise you couldn't spend on defense. All the three Baltic states have managed this economic crisis quite well, so I thiunk we have a platform or a basis for increased defense spending.
Of course, 1 percent is not enough. The same goes for Sweden, we spend 1.2 percent aproximately and that is not enough, either. So I think we all should do our best when we get the resources, when the economy becomes more stable, to increase our defense spending to somewhere near 2 percent. But everyone knows that this will take time. I think you have to accept realities - but the defense spending has to be bigger.
How do you regard the US moving away from Europe, do you see it as a source of some kind of instability in Europe or do you see it as a natural thing? What could happen, if Americans withdrew from Europe in significant numbers?
Neretnieks: That depends very much on how you look at the problem. From an American point of view, the move is totally logical, because the biggest problems the US will have in the future are in Asia and the Middle East, not, hopefully, in Europe. So from an American point of view, there's nothing to save, they should indeed move capacities from Europe to the Middle East and Asia.
Then we have the European view. It should not be a problem for Europe, really. If we were prepared to spend on defense. Why should the US, which has a smaller economy than the European Union, defend us? Why can't we pay for our own defense? If we are lucky, if we, Europeans, do the right thing, we will increase our defense spending to compensate for US withdrawal - if you call it that. Unfortunately, I don't think we will do it. But we should.
Thirdly, and that perhaps is the most important thing, how will the Russians interpret the US pivoting towards Asia? That is the truly crucial question when it comes to stability. Will the Russians just shrug and say "okay, that’s the way it is" or will they see an opportunity for a Russian power politics in Europe. That we don't know and that is the most important thing.
Hugemark: Let's not forget that the latest enlargement of NATO, which included the Baltic states, was a result of a shift by America from Europe to the Middle East and fight with terrorism. George W. Bush said back then: finish the thing, take the package of NATO enlargement and I can take on the terrorism". And he did it exactly at the right moment when Russians were also very anxious about terrorism. So we had Russian compliance with it. Now the situation is really different, because Russians regained their stance and may use their opportunity. But the step of enlarging NATO was absolutely necessary for the future of Europe.
What do you think about the military cooperation of the three Baltic countries? We host the NATO air-policing mission, which is based in Šiauliai, although Estonians want to move it to the Amari base. Do you think it could cause clashes visible to other partners?
Neretnieks: This Baltic cooperation is an extremely tricky subject. Because the three Baltic states are not similar. They have different languages, sometimes different ways of thinking, different geography, different neighbors. Just to give one example - it would be much more logical, if Estonians cooperated with Finns and you cooperated with Poles instead of trying to create some kind of cooperation among Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia in between. From a military point of view, that would be much more logical. But we also have to take political realities into consideration. And the political reality is that the Baltic cooperation is one of the few solutions that are available today. But if Finland joined NATO and Sweden joined NATO, things would look very different.
